We analyze the effects of changes in the purpose of large German corporations from stakeholder-oriented organizations to shareholder-oriented organizations during the decade of the 1990s. We document this transformation by first examining the annual reports of large firms at strategic points in time relative to significant changes in German corporate law. We find that changes in the law over this period both reflected and facilitated a fundamental shift in the operations of German corporations as evidenced by their adoption of stock-and option-based incentive compensation plans, adoption of US GAAP-based (or related) accounting systems, ADR listings, and restructuring activity. We also document the emergence and adoption of the rhetoric of shareholder value among German managers, the public, and the media. Detailed empirical analysis shows that German firms that embraced shareholder value as their corporate purpose and operating strategy realized a slight gain in equity values over the decade of the 1990s, as well as a significant increase in their Betas relative to the S&P 500, when compared to less shareholder-oriented firms. We interpret the Beta shifts as evidence that focusing on shareholder value leads firms to adopt entrepreneurial risk-taking strategies that reflect shareholder, rather than stakeholder, concerns. We conjecture that the increase in Betas might also be due to the adoption by some German firms of a similar operating philosophy to that of the traditionally shareholder-oriented US corporation. Finally, we show that German firms that embraced shareholder value-orientation during the 1990s realized significantly greater growth in their Market-to-Book ratios and market capitalizations relative to their less shareholder-oriented counterparts. 
Introduction
For the past two decades scholars have been debating the nature of the evolution of corporate governance structures and practices throughout the world. Much of the debate centers on the degree to which corporate governance structures are converging toward an optimal form.
Two camps are well represented in the literature. There are those who believe that global competition in capital markets, product markets, and the market for corporate control will result in an optimal governance structure to which all economies will inevitably be driven. The general belief among these scholars is that this optimal form resembles the Anglo-American corporation to varying degrees. Alternatively, there are those who believe that path dependencies, culture, and historical serendipity will prevent convergence to any one optimal form.
The early literature denied the existence of an optimal corporate form and cautioned against drawing any generalizations to pronounce one particular form superior to the alternatives.
It was argued that the different governance structures found in the leading economies throughout the world, such as the US, Germany, Japan and the UK were 'efficient' forms in their own respective ways, since these corporate economies could not have become successful and endured for so long had there been major deficiencies inherent in their governance structures. 1 The literature subsequently split into two camps: the 'path dependency camp' which holds that path dependencies, cultures, and historical serendipity prevent the convergence to any one optimum, 2 and the 'optimal governance camp' which holds that global competition will manifest an optimal governance structure to which all economies will inevitably be driven. 3 The path dependency camp argues that the persistence of alternative corporate forms results from economic structures being dependent on those that preceded it. Factors contributing to this dependence are 'structure-driven' (e.g., informal rules and ownership structures) and 'rule-driven' (e.g., laws). Efficiency considerations, interest group politics, and rent-seeking behavior militate against revolutionary change. In contrast, the 'optimal governance camp' points to a unidirectional trend toward convergence. While governance systems in the European Union (EU) and in Japan, traditionally viewed as communitarian or stakeholder systems of governance, were adopting features of the Anglo-American model-characterized by a system that focuses on shareholder value-there was no evidence of the reverse, implying that the socalled contractarian model was optimal. 4 Further, this move toward the contractarian model seemed to trump path-dependence, since the structures and rules that lead to persistence are themselves endogenous in the long-run. 5 This debate is certainly interesting and has provided rich cross-country, comparative analyses and data. But the literature may be missing a larger issue. It is not so much that international governance structures may or may not be converging to an optimal form, rather the fundamental issue is whether the overarching purpose or objective of the public corporation is changing throughout the world. It is our assessment that such a transformation is, in fact, taking place and this transformation is toward a system that is shareholder-oriented. As such, we believe that we are not witnessing a convergence but rather a conversion-a conversion to the notion that the purpose of the business corporation is to enhance shareholder value. 6 Corporate governance itself is just a process that serves a larger purpose, namely the goal or purpose of the corporation. The outward manifestation of a governance system tells us little about the underlying goal that guides the firm's activities. We may find outward manifestations of the governance process that seem to be different (e.g., labor representation versus no labor 4 This literature grounds its arguments on the belief that the globalization of product and capital markets and the emergence of a worldwide market for corporate control will lead firms to adopt a contractarian governance structure. 5 See Easterbrook (1997) . As Bradley et al. (1999, p. 79) argue, "…the efficiencies and contractarian imperatives of global competition [would] propel changes in the underlying legal, political, and social infrastructures in …. communitarian economies" and thus attenuate the influence of factors that cause persistence. More recently, the arguments have come full circle. Some recent scholarship raises the thesis that the arguments for path-dependence, convergence, and even more specifically, convergence to the American norm are not only wrong since there are different types of "embedded capitalism" (see e.g., Branson, 2001) . 6 Convergence implies gradual, evolutionary change; conversion implies rapid, revolutionary change. Convergence suggests that there may be changes in the observable manifestations of governance at the corporate level, i.e., in the internal mechanisms of governance such as managerial compensation/reward systems, board structure and composition, and so forth; conversion suggests that we should also observe changes in the external governance context, e.g., changes in the market for corporate control, the product market, the capital market, ownership structure, and regulatory environment. Convergence is consistent with arguments for social and cultural embeddedness, with law, interest group politics, and culture being exogenous variables and therefore the persistence of inefficient governance forms; conversion is consistent with the law-and-economics viewpoint that embedding forces such as law, interest-group politics, and culture are themselves endogenous. Convergence implies that two different governance systems are moving toward each other and will meet somewhere in between; conversion implies a unidirectional movement of one system to the other. representation in the boardroom) and yet, upon deeper examination, find that both processes could be serving an identical corporate purpose (e.g., 'maximizing shareholder value').
Our thesis is that in order to understand comparative corporate governance, we would be better served by focusing attention on whether there is convergence in corporate purpose, rather than a convergence in form. We do so by undertaking a detailed empirical assessment of developments in the third largest industrialized economy in the world-that of Germany. The
German experience offers us a rare, and fortuitous 'laboratory setting' to study a transformation in corporate purpose and consequently, governance practices. Specifically, we examine the changes in corporate governance practices and their efficiency implications, as well as the changes in the legal-political-economic environment of the large, publicly-traded German corporation during the 1990s. In this examination, we ask the following questions: (1) Are the transformations in the German governance system that we observed over the decade of the 1990s consistent with the traditional stakeholder-oriented German corporation, or are we witnessing the third largest industrial economy in the world moving toward a shareholder-oriented corporate economy? (2) What are the efficiency and share price implications for German companies adopting such practices? (3) What are the implications of these changes for the traditional governance practice embodied in the stakeholder doctrine of 'codetermination,' which provides for an explicit role for labor in the governance process? (Prior to the decade of the 1990s, codetermination had been the centerpiece of German corporate law.)
German Governance: A Brief Historical Overview
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to understanding the governance of the large, publicly-traded German corporation (for a detailed assessment and references, see Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh (1999)) 7 . We present only a brief summary of the salient features of the traditional German governance system in order to provide a backdrop for the dramatic changes we have witnessed during the 1990s.
There are two basic organizational forms for large-scale German companies: stock corporations or "Aktiengesellschaften" ("AG") and limited liability companies "Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung" ("GmbH"). The primary distinction between the two organizational forms is that the shares of AG firms are traded on organized exchanges. 8 An important difference between German corporations and their Anglo-American counterparts is the existence of a twotiered board structure. By law, all AGs and large GmbHs are required to be governed by a supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat") and a management board ("Vorstand"). The supervisory board, which is responsible for strategy formulation, appoints, oversees and, if necessary, disciplines or even dismisses members of the management board. The management board has responsibility for strategy implementation, i.e., the day-to-day operations of the firm. The Aufsichtsrat can include outside directors, while the Vorstand consists of senior company managers (equivalent to the officers in a US company). Members of the management board cannot serve as members of the supervisory board and vice versa. The most notable aspect of the German governance system is that the supervisory board must be comprised of a specified fraction of employees, depending on the size and industry of the firm. This practice, known as 'codetermination,' is a legislated guarantee of employee involvement in the strategy and operations of the firm.
German corporate law was initially codified in 1937, and subsequently modified in 1965.
Under the 1937 law, the role of the board of directors and the objective of the public corporation are defined as follows (the original German words are in parentheses): "The managing board is, on its own responsibility, to manage the corporation for the good of the enterprise and its retinue (Gefolgschaft), the common weal of the folk (Volk) and the state (Reich)." 9 Nothing specific was mentioned in German corporate law about shareholders until the 1965 revision. The law also provides that if a company endangers public welfare and does not take corrective action, it can be dissolved by an act of the state. Despite the relatively recent recognition that shareholders represent an important constituency (see discussion in the next Section), corporate law in Germany has historically made it clear that shareholders are only one of the many stakeholders on whose behalf the managers must manage the firm.
Equity ownership structure in Germany differs quite substantially from that observed in the US. As of the mid-1990s, approximately 14% of the shares of German corporations were owned by banks, and about 40% by other German corporations (both constituencies hold virtually nothing in the US). Less than 17% of the equity was owned by households (as compared to approximately 50% in the US), a proportion that has steadily declined since the 1950s. Historically, ownership of German corporations has been concentrated in the hands of financial institutions and other corporations. As of the mid-1990s, roughly 25% of the listed German firms had a single majority shareholder, and such majority holdings accounted for about 65% of the value of all listed stocks. Importantly, a substantial portion of equity in Germany traded in the form of bearer stock, unlike registered stock in the US. As a result, such equity was left on deposit with the primary banker to the corporation (the 'hausbank'), which handled matters such as dividend transfers and record-keeping. German law allowed banks to vote such equity on deposit by proxy, unless depositors explicitly instructed their bank to do otherwise.
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Compounding the influence of banks was the 'voting caps' provision in many company charters, whereby non-bank shareholders could not exercise more than 5% to 10% of the total votes, regardless of the proportion of shares they owned. Furthermore, even when a company elected to have its shares listed on an exchange, the common practice was to list only non-voting shares.
Historically, German firms have relied heavily on intermediated debt. Market debt instruments played a relatively minor role in the financing of the typical German corporation.
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Dividend payout rules were designed to protect creditor interests.
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The market for corporate 10 As a result, banks directly or indirectly controlled a large portion of the equity in German companies. In a study reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1995) of large, non-majorityowned firms in Germany, Baums and Fraune found that nearly 85% of the voting shares in 1992 was controlled by banks and their associated investment funds. 11 The minor role of market debt is explained by the restrictions placed by the German government on the issuance of such debt. Issuance of commercial paper and domestic bonds was discouraged until 1992 by complicated authorization procedures and transfer taxes. The issuance of foreign currency bonds was prohibited until 1990, and the issuance of Eurobonds was subjected to maturity restrictions. Also until 1990, there was a 1% tax on the value of all new equity issues, and secondary trading in equities was subject to a transaction tax. Companies also paid a 1% tax on their net asset value, a tax that must be paid even if the firm is not profitable. 12 German law stipulated that dividends may not be paid out from paid-in capital, even if such paid-in capital includes a premium over the face value of equity. This provision made it impossible for German firms to undertake share repurchases. Moreover, companies were required to retain a portion of their profits as reserves, serving as added security for creditors. control was poorly developed.
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Hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts were virtually nonexistent.
14 There was formal takeover law. Disclosure was considered inadequate by AngloAmerican standards.
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Stocks and options as the basis for CEO compensation were virtually unheard of, with compensation comprising a basic salary plus bonus. As a result, the average salary for CEOs of large firms in Germany were about one-half to one-third of that for their US counterparts (Murphy (1998) ).
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In summary, the historical German governance system was characterized by little reliance on external capital markets; a small role for individual share ownership and a disproportionately large role for concentrated institutional/inter-corporate ownership; relatively permanent capital providers; boards comprising functional specialists and insiders with knowledge of the firm and the industry; a relatively important role for banks as financiers, advisors, managers and monitors of top management; a preference for bank-debt financing; an emphasis on salary and bonuses rather than stocks and options as the basis for top management compensation; and a relatively poor disclosure regime from the standpoint of outside investors. In many respects, the German governance system emphasized the welfare of employees and creditors over the interests of shareholders. The market for corporate control was largely absent. Put simply, the traditional German governance system can be characterized as having been a substantially communitarian, stakeholder-oriented system, with shareholders being only one of the many constituencies that managers must serve.
However, the German governance system has been far from static over the past decade.
Significant changes have transformed the governance and legal systems into a more shareholderoriented environment. As we will see below, these changes began to gather momentum in the early 1990s.
13 Prowse (1994) reports that during the period 1985-89, only 2.3% of the market value of listed stocks was involved in mergers and acquisitions, compared to over 40% in the US.
14 There were only four hostile takeovers in Germany since World War II through the late 1980s. 15 In an OECD survey of corporations across the US, Germany and Japan, the companies were rated relative to OECD guidelines for "full," "partial" or "not implemented" disclosure. Two thirds of the US firms surveyed met the "full" disclosure standard and the other one third of US firms surveyed had "partial" disclosure. In contrase, none of the German firms surveyed met the OECD's "full" disclosure requirement.
Changes In German Governance: Regulations
The change in corporate focus of the German corporation could not have happened if the regulatory environment of public corporations in Germany had not changed as well. In this Section we review the major changes in German corporate law that have facilitated the change in corporate purpose that we observe. We describe the legal milestones during the past decade, and designate three broad regulatory regimes for German corporations over this period: the 'codetermination' regime (the prevailing norm until early 1990), the 'transition' regime (1990 -1994) , and, the 'shareholder value' regime (1995 -present).
As already mentioned, the supervisory board of a large, public German corporation must be comprised of a specified fraction of employees. This practice, known as codetermination, is a legislated guarantee of employee involvement in the strategy and operations of the firm. The first codetermination law was enacted as the 1951 Coal and Steel Codetermination Act, which applied strictly to those two industries. Under the legislation, the supervisory boards of firms in these industries had to have equal representation between employees and shareholders. In 1952, this legislation was extended to cover to all industries, requiring that a third of the seats be given to employee representatives in companies with 500 or more employees. The most recent version of the law, the Codetermination Act of 1976, requires that employees elect half of the members of the supervisory board in all companies with 2,000 or more employees.
Codetermination occurs at two levels within the German corporation. At the company level, employee input into the governance process is assured by their representation on the Aufsichtsrat. At the plant level, codetermination occurs within groups known as "Works Councils" ("Betriebsrat"). German law specifies the size and composition of works councils for each firm, again depending on its size and industry. For large corporations, (defined as those with more than 600 employees) a specified number of the members of the work council must be "freed from work" in order to attend to corporate matters.
Prior to 1990 there was no unified capital market law in Germany. Rules and regulations governing the issuance and trading of securities were found in various parts of the law, such as corporation law, securities exchange law, and banking law. The Prospectus Act of 1990, which was the major component of the 'First Financial Market Promotion Act,' was the first legislative act in German history to have as its primary goal the protection of investors in German capital markets. The Act governed the prospectus requirements for all first-time securities that are offered to the public and had not previously been registered to trade on a German stock exchange.
Far-reaching securities legislation was enacted by the German Parliament via the 'Second Financial Market Promotion Act' (SFMPA), which came into effect in January 1, 1995.
Although the intent of the law was to define and curtail the practice of insider trading, the creation of a system and a process to monitor, detect, prosecute and punish violators had a significant effect on all aspects of the German equity market. The legislation created the Federal Supervisory Office on Securities Trading (FSO), an agency roughly equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US. In an attempt to provide the Supervisory Office with sufficient information to prosecute violations of the insider-trading laws, the legislation mandates that issuers inform the FSO of any new non-public facts that could have an effect on the issuer's financial position or general business activities and which could, if publicly known, have a significant effect on the price of its securities. "The adoption of further mandatory provisions in the German corporation law ought to be avoided as far as possible. Instead of strict directives, it is preferable to leave companies more leeway in organizing themselves. Control should be provided by the existing supervisory boards and the markets. The law should actively keep pace with public corporations as they gear up to the requirements and expectations of international financial markets. This also means that corporate strategy needs to be more strongly oriented towards shareholder value."
The Act covered a wide range of issues of importance to shareholders, including the conduct of the annual general meetings, the use of proxy voting rights of banks, the enabling of stock option programs, allowance of share repurchases (which had been previously disallowed under German law), disclosure of inter-corporate share ownership, limitations on serving on multiple boards, and the use of voting caps.
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The 1998 KonTraG was followed by the Tax Reduction Act of 2001 (effective January 2002), which eliminated capital gains tax from the sale of stock by corporate shareholders. The basic purpose behind this legislation was to provide incentives for the inter-corporate ownership-estimated to be about 40% of the German stockholdings-to be unwound, and equally important, to give the German banks the incentive to reduce their equity holdings of the corporate sector. The 2001 tax law was, in turn, followed by the Securities Acquisitions and Takeover Act of 2002, which for the first time formally regulates mergers with, and acquisitions of, publicly traded German firms. The Takeover Act addresses rules governing tender offers, Supervisory board roles in takeover situations, stock versus cash-based offers, hostile takeovers, and minority squeeze-outs. 20 We thus observe three distinct regimes, each with its own implications for the conduct and purpose of the German corporation: a period spanning the late 1930s to 1990 representing a stakeholder-oriented 'codetermination' regime, with labor and banks playing substantial governance roles; followed by a 'transition' regime from 1990 to 1994, a period in which legislation was enacted that provided greater protection to shareholders' interests somewhat indirectly; and finally, from 1995 and on, a 'shareholder value'-oriented regime that not only directly focuses on shareholder value creation and shareholder protection concerns, but also seeks to limit the influence of other stakeholders, especially banks. We present the relevant time line in Figure 1 . We will return to this classification later in the paper, when we present our analysis of the implications of these distinct regimes for the wealth of German stockholders. 
Changes In German Governance: The Rhetoric of Governance and Corporate Practice
The German language had no equivalent expression for the English language phrase 'shareholder value' until the mid-1990s.
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But as we will demonstrate in this section, there was not only a dramatic rise in the use of the English-language phrase 'shareholder value' in the German media around 1991, but starting in 1995, a new German word surfaced to describe this phenomenon.
From 1980 through 1990, there does not appear to have been a single instance in which the English term 'shareholder value' appeared in the German language media (see Table 1 ). The first use of this phrase appears to have been in the publication Sueddeutsche Zeitung on July 12, 1991. In 1992, there were two mentions and in 1993, two more mentions. In the following year, there were 11 mentions. However, the year 1995 seems to have been the 'breakthrough' year for the adoption of 'shareholder value:' its use increased nearly 17-fold, to 182 mentions. By the year 2000, there were well over one thousand mentions of this English phrase. During the period 1991 (when it first appeared) to 2001, there were a total of 6621 mentions of 'shareholder value.' 21 Bradley, Schipani, Walsh (1999) at 52, quoting Stephan Wagstyl (1996) . As a result, the standard practice in referring to the phenomenon was (and continues to be) to simply use the English language phrase! however, that this word did not quite catch on among business writers in Germany. As can be seen from the data in Table 1 , in its first year of use, the new word was mentioned twice. The dramatic rise in the usage of the phrase "shareholder value," and the attempts to create a German-language equivalent-albeit unsuccessful-suggests that something significant did change in the German mindset during the 1990s, at least in terms of the public rhetoric on corporate governance.
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We now turn to a longitudinal analysis of the extent to which the concept of shareholder value maximization was embraced by the managers of the largest public corporations in Germany. Specifically, we examine the annual reports, management discussions, incentive systems, and disclosure practices of these firms. We have chosen to focus on the so-called DAX 22 We are grateful to Jutta Ulrich (a Professor of German language at Thunderbird) for pointing us to this development. 23 In the organizational studies literature, it has been suggested that the study of shareholder value orientation of German corporations has been done with a presumption of a 'context-free theory' derived in the Anglo-American setting, and that the diffusion of the 'shareholder value' ideology did not result in a wholesale adoption of the practice (Zajac and Fiss, 2001 ). The authors also suggest that while the rhetoric of 'shareholder value' may be on the rise, it has been top-down in nature and that there may be no 'actual implementation of such strategic shift' (p. 14). We shall provide ample evidence to the contrary below.
30 firms.
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In order to measure the change in attitude towards shareholder value, we examined the annual report of each of the firms in the current DAX 30 at three points in time, corresponding to the three different time-periods (regimes) that we identified in the previous Section. Ideally, we would like to have data from the 1980s, clearly a period of Codetermination.
However, the availability of annual reports falls off dramatically prior to 1990. Therefore, we begin with 1990, a year we have designated as the beginning of a transitional period during which German firms began to focus on shareholder value. We also examine the annual reports of these firms in 1995, the year of the Second Announcement and again in 1999, the year of the Transparency Act. We obtained the annual reports through direct communication with the firms.
We obtained both the English and the German versions of the annual reports.
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In examining the annual reports, we focused on five factors:
1. The objective of the firm as stated in the "official" letter to the firm's stockholders;
2. Whether the firm had an employee stock purchase plan;
3. Whether the managers of the firm had stock-based compensation packages;
4. Whether the managers had stock option plans;
5. The firm's choice of accounting method. Table 2 reports the results of our analysis of the annual reports of the firms in the current DAX 30 regarding corporate objectives. Our primary focus is on the language used by the managers of these firms when communicating their firms' objectives to their constituencies.
(TABLE 2 HERE)
It is rather astonishing that in 1990 more than half (54%) of the 22 firms in the current DAX 30 that existed at the time did not even mention stockholders in their annual reports. We found statements to stockholders in the remaining 46%, but the comments were more in the form 24 One of the criteria for inclusion in the DAX is the depth of the market for a firm's securities. The DAX 30 accounts for more than 70% of the market capitalization of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and for about 75% of the total daily volume of all German equities. Consequently, the equity of firm's in the DAX trade much more frequently than the typical German corporation. Foreign investors hold about 40% of the DAX. Arguably, an active, international market for a firm's shares would make the firm's management more responsive to shareholder preferences. We next examined the annual reports for any indication that the firms in the DAX 30 paid more attention to the market price of their firms' stock. The data in Table 3 address this. In 1990 only 8 firms (36%) had employee stock purchase programs. By 1999 that number had increased to 19 firms or 63% of the DAX 30. Obviously, the incentives for employees to maximize the value of their firms' equity increased dramatically during the decade of the 1990s. (TABLE 3 HERE) 26 Typical among these comments are those from Bayer AG: "Dear shareholders, . . . at the same time we thank all of our business partners and finally you, our stockholders, for your confidence in our Company," (1990, p.7); from Degussa-Huels AG, "Dear Shareholders . . ., the Board and employees of Degussa thank you for your continued support," (1998/90, p.7); from Preussag AG, "Message to our shareholders . . . the merger of Preussag AG and Salzgitter AG has created a group with new qualities, not only for our shareholders, employees and the public, but indeed for competition as well," (1990, p.12); and finally from RWE AG, "From the Chairman (German version: Dear Shareholder) . . . the trust and support of you, the shareholders, is all important," (p. 4-6). 27 In the years following 1995 companies seemingly tried to avoid the English term "shareholder value" and started using other terms. Instead of talking about increasing "shareholder value," they talked about increasing the "value of the company" ("Steigerung des Unternehmenswertes").
A similar pattern emerges in terms of the incentives of corporate managers to maximize shareholder value. In 1990 not one firm in the DAX 30 reported a stock-based compensation plan for their managers. However, by 1995 seven firms (27%) had adopted such compensation plans and by 1999, the number jumped to 22 or 73% of the firms in the DAX 30. The adoption of stock-option plans followed at a much slower pace. None of the firms in the DAX 30 granted options to their managers in 1990.
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In 1995 only one firm (Siemens) did so. However by 1999 almost half of the DAX 30 (47%) firms had instituted stock option plans for their management.
We also examined if and when the firm adopted either international accounting standards (IAS) or US GAAP. A change to a more rigorous accounting method would evidence an attempt by managers to facilitate better monitoring of the firm's activities in order to attract outside investors. A change to IAS or GAAP can also be seen as a commitment device designed to assure investors that the firm's management will act in their interest, i.e., become more shareholder-oriented. None of the firms in the current DAX 30 operated under either IAS or US GAAP in 1990. By 1995 five firms or 25% of the sample had changed to one or the other accounting system, and by 1999, 83% had done so.
Since accounting under US GAAP is a prerequisite for listing on a US stock exchange, those firms that have issued American Deposit Receipts (ADRs) or have their shares listed in the US are a subset of the previous sample (line 4 in the Table 3 ). 28 At least, none were reported in their 1990 annual reports. 29 There is a vast literature on ADR listings and their valuation impacts. For comprehensive surveys, see Karolyi (1998) , and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) .
As we all know, talk is cheap. Actions are driven by incentives, not rhetoric. But here again, we see a definite trend, as reflected in the incentive systems for both employees and managers to maximize shareholder value. The increased popularity of employee stock purchase programs, stock-based compensation plans and executive stock-options over the past ten years all suggest that the employees and managements of these companies had become more focused on creating shareholder value by 1999 than they were a decade prior. We also see the adoption of IAS or GAAP as a commitment device by managers to signal that they are acting in the interest of the firm's stockholders.
None of this evidence amounts to much unless it is ultimately reflected the performance of the firm and its equity. We will turn to that issue in the Section after the next. But before we examine the effects of the changing environment in the 1990s on the performance of German stocks, we review the rationale, philosophical underpinnings, and more important for our purposes, the specific empirical implications of a shift in emphasis toward shareholder value maximization. In other words, as a firm's operating policies change from focusing on stakeholder welfare to shareholder welfare, what effects should we expect to observe in its operating and financial policies, and its stock market performance?
The Rationale for, and Implications of Shareholder Value Maximization
In the Anglo-American, especially American, system of governance, the logic of shareholder value maximization is so taken for granted that its origins, meanings, and implications are often just assumed to be understood. As is well known, in the US, the shareholder value logic finds its roots the in famous Dodge v. Ford decision rendered by the Michigan Supreme court in 1919.
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The philosophy behind the Dodge v. Ford decision has been 30 The issue in this case was whether or not Henry Ford could use the substantial accumulated earnings of the Ford Motor Company to build a steel foundry for the purpose of reducing the price of automobiles to the American consumer. This action was brought by the Dodge brothers, as shareholders of Ford Motor Co. to compel the payment of these accumulated funds as a dividend. At the time the company had 1500 shares outstanding. Henry Ford owned 225 and the Dodge brothers owned 50. In the much-cited (and celebrated) decision, the court stated: "There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. Anglo-American countries, and increasingly so in other major economies around the world?
What specific implications for firm conduct and performance follow from the adoption of shareholder value maximization as the corporate objective? In a recent study that synthesizes and analyzes literatures from law, finance, strategy, and organizational studies, Sundaram and Inkpen (2003) address the first two questions at length. Specifically, they argue that there are five rationales for the primacy of the shareholder value maximization rule and that these rationales illustrate why this has become the most preferred among all available objective functions that managers could rely on as a guide in the conduct of their business.
Rationale 1: Maximizing Shareholder Value Maximizes the Value of the Whole Firm
Synthesizing the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) , and Macey (1989; among others, Sundaram and Inkpen argue that only residual cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the firm, since claimants to committed or fixed cash flows-such as employees and debtholders-have no incentive to increase the value of the firm beyond the point at which their claims are assured.
Control rights should go to shareholders since, as residual claimants, they are the constituency that will value this right most. Shareholders have the greatest incentive to induce firms to engage in activities that fixed claimants would consider excessively risky, since they gain all of the benefits from the success of risky activities, but because of limited liability, stand to lose only the amount of their initial capital investment. Fixed claimants do no better whether the firm performs 'spectacularly well' or just 'well.' Recognizing the incentives for managers to take on excessively risky projects, particularly when the firm is in financial distress, creditors will 'price-protect' themselves and adjust the price they would pay for their fixed claims to compensate for the prospect that the firm subsequently will undertake activities that lead to an expropriation of their wealth. Thus, it will be the shareholders, not fixed claimants, who bear the costs of any anticipated excessive risk taking. In essence, managing on behalf of shareholders forces managers to go beyond effort levels that would suffice were they were to manage the firm on behalf of its fixed claimants. By going beyond the requirements of such committed claims, managers increase the size of the pie for all constituencies.
A corollary of this argument is that managing on behalf of fixed claimants (stakeholders) will lead the firm forego positive-NPV projects, lower its value, and thereby increase its cost of capital.
Rationale 2: Only Shareholder Value Maximization Is Consistent With Appropriate Entrepreneurial Risk-taking Incentives
Sundaram and Inkpen (2003) draw upon the work of Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh (1999) to argue that managers often bear unacceptable amounts of non-diversifiable human capital risk in one asset: the firm for which they work. Even though they may be diversified in their personal portfolio and the firm's stock, this may not be sufficient to compensate for the risk of unemployment. This can lead managers to focus on the total risk characteristics of the firm's cash flows, when what actually maters for shareholder value maximization is risk that cannot be diversified away, i.e., the systematic risk of the assets contained in a well-diversified portfolio. Put simply, managers who manage on behalf of shareholders care about the systematic risks of a firm's cash flows in the context of a diversified portfolio and are only as risk-averse as the shareholders at the margin, whereas poorly diversified managers care about the systematic plus any unsystematic risks of the firm's cash flows and thus tend to be more risk averse than their shareholders. Managing on behalf of fixed claimants such as debtholders and employees exacerbates the incentive for entrepreneurial risk aversion since fixed claimants are also driven to minimize total risk. Such entrepreneurial risk aversion can lead to an over-reliance on decisions to stabilize cash flows such as survival or maximizing market share. Entrepreneurial risk aversion can lead to unprofitable diversification, excessive hedging, and avoidance of high-growth investment opportunities. Again, a corollary, as with Rationale 1, is that such behavior would lead to a decrease in its market value.
Rationale 3: It Is Not Possible to Maximize More Than One Objective Function
Having more than one objective function creates the potential for confusion and dithering in managerial decision-making. As Jensen (2001, p. 10) argues, "multiple objectives is no objective," since "it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are monotone transformations of one another. The result will be confusion and lack of purpose that will fundamentally handicap the firm in its competition for survival."
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Put simply, it is not possible to manage on behalf of multiple constituencies when their goals are in conflict. Even if it were possible to do so, it may not be socially desirable to allow managers the unfettered freedom to do so. Shareholder value, on the other hand, is a single-valued metric that is also observable and measurable and whose maximization is consistent with value maximization for other constituencies as well.
Rationale 4: Stakeholders Can Become Shareholders, But the Reverse Is Not Easy
Sundaram and Inkpen point out that there is no reason why non-share-owning stakeholders, who are concerned about the potential abuses of shareholder value maximization,
could not choose to become shareholders themselves. In the case of a publicly traded firm, these constituencies can buy shares in the open market, thereby becoming shareholders and availing themselves of all shareholders' rights. However, it is not as easy for the reverse to happen. For example, it is impossible for a stockholder to demand to become an employee or a supplier of the firm. This being the case, shareholders would be denied the opportunity to participate in the governance process in those firms that manage on behalf of alternative constituencies.
Rationale 5: The Law Fills the Judicial Void for Stakeholders
The interests of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, bondholders, communities, and customers are protected by contract law and by regulation (Bradley et al., 1999: 24-29; Ramseyer, 1998; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000: 10) .
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Shareholders have no recourse through 31 This builds on the earlier work of Fama and Jensen (1983) , and invokes the Arrow Impossibility Theorem (Arrow, 1950) : Under certain conditions for 'fair' decision-making, there is no consistent method of making a fair choice among three or more alternatives.-i.e., there is no majority-voting procedure that can always fairly decide an outcome when more than two alternatives are involved. For example, apart from shareholders, if there are multiple classes of stakeholders, then there is no fair way to democratically decide on whose behalf the board should vote to manage the firm.
contract law. Essentially, as Macey & Miller (1991) argue, the legal system derived the fiduciary system for filling gaps that arise in the terms of shareholders' implicit contracts with management. It is not that stakeholders have all the contracting power they need or that shareholders have no judicial recourse whatsoever. Rather, the argument is that stakeholders have greater ability to explicitly contract with the firm and thereby have the backing of the judicial system to step in to fill the inevitable voids created by the limitations of explicit contracting.
Rationale 6: Expanding the Firm's Equity Base
A final rationale for adopting a shareholder-value orientation, and one that is particularly relevant in this study since we focus on large corporations-many of which are global in scope and size-is to attract new equity investors from the global capital pool. This is especially true for firms operating in environments without well-developed capital markets, which, as we documented in a previous section, was the case with Germany in the early part of the 1990s.
In a series of influential papers, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (see, for example, La Porta et al. (1999)) show a positive relation between the existence of legal and regulatory protections of (minority) shareholders' rights and the existence of a well-developed capital market. If, during this period, German firms were attempting to attract new equity capital it would behoove them to act at least outwardly as if they were adopting a more shareholderoriented philosophy, and to adopt operating practices such as stock-and option-based compensation plans, IAS or GAAP accounting, and so forth to signal a shift to shareholder-value orientation.
Empirical Implications
The preceding arguments suggest a number of empirically testable implications when a firm shifts its corporate objective away from stakeholder value-orientation toward shareholder value-orientation:
• The adoption of a more shareholder value-oriented governance structure and pursuit of a more shareholder value-oriented operating strategy should increase the value of the firm's outstanding equity;
• Since firms that adopt a more shareholder-oriented operating strategy will be more willing to assume higher entrepreneurial risk, we are likely to observe an increase in the variance of expected returns of these firms, and accordingly, an increase in their Betas;
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• Shareholder-oriented firms should have higher Market-to-Book ratios and faster growth in their equity values, compared to less shareholder-oriented firms.
Empirical Effects of Greater Shareholder Value Orientation
In the first part of this section, we examine changes in the characteristics of returns to the stockholders of firms in the current DAX 30 over the decade of the 1990s. The purpose is to examine whether the increased focus on shareholder value that we documented in Section 5 is associated with increased returns to the stockholders (higher Alphas), higher Betas (covariances with the market), and whether we can observe any effects of the change in corporate purpose on shareholder value. In the second part of our empirical analysis, we examine the impact of this change on the firms' market values (specifically, the Market-to-Book ratios), and the rate of growth in their market capitalization.
In order to conduct our empirical analysis, we construct an index of shareholder orientation for the DAX 30 firms. We use this index to classify the firms in our sample into those that are more shareholder oriented (MSO) and those that are less shareholder oriented (LSO). Of course, we recognize that any such exercise is fraught with possible selection biases, omitted variables, multicollinearity problems and other misspecifications. Nonetheless, we believe that it is still useful to examine if any discernible patterns emerge between the two groups of firms.
The DAX 30 Sample and the DAX 30 Shareholder Orientation Index
Since firms in the DAX became shareholder-oriented over time and to differing degrees, we have both time-series and cross-sectional data. We construct an index of 'shareholder value orientation' by collapsing these observations into an index score for each firm in our sample. In our scheme-admittedly arbitrary, and potentially prone to specification biases-each firm is 33 As Fama (1976) argues (see pp. 255-256), if there is no systematic relationship between correlations of returns on securities and standard deviations of returns, then securities with larger standard deviations of returns will have larger average covariances with the returns on other securities.
given points for the various data categories that we defined in Section 5.
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On some of the attributes, firms are given an additional point if the designated action occurred or was adopted in 1995 as opposed to 1999. We believe that the earlier a practice is initiated or adopted, the greater the effect it should have on the firm's stock price.
We assign the highest value, a score of three points, to the adoption of a stock-based compensation plan for managers, since we view this as direct evidence of an attempt to align management and shareholder interests. If this adoption occurred earlier, in 1995 as opposed to 1999, we award an extra point. If the firm also adopts a stock option plan or creates a share purchase program for its employees, we award an additional point each for such adoption. We assign the second highest value, a score of two points, if the firm adopts a more transparent accounting system in the form of either the IAS or the US GAAP, or listed an ADR on the NYSE; an additional point is awarded if this occurred in 1995 instead of 1999. Finally, we award one point if the managers mentioned in a particular year's annual report that their objective was to maximize shareholder value or firm value-one point for each year (1990, 1995, 1999 ). Thus, the maximum possible number of points under this scheme is 12, and the minimum zero. A firm with a score equal to or above the median is placed into the 'MSO' (more shareholder orientation) sample, and a score below the median puts the firm in the 'LSO' (less shareholder orientation) sample. A table detailing the scoring of each firm is included in the Appendix.
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This scoring scheme generates a range of scores from zero for KarstadtQuelle, to 11 for Bayer. Table 4 lists the DAX 30 sample firms in decreasing order of their Shareholder Orientation Index (hereafter called the DAX 30 Index). Because of data availability issues, we also indicate which firms are in the sample that we use in our empirical tests.
(TABLE 4 HERE)
34 Despite these potential difficulties, many recent studies have, however, constructed and used such governance scores or indexes; see, for example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ; Durnev and Kim (2002) . In the context of German firms, at least two recent studies have used such scores (Hoepner (2001) which is discussed in more detail below, and Tuschke and Sanders (2003)).
An Alternate Sample: The Hoepner Shareholder Orientation Index
Since most of the firms in the DAX 30 increased their shareholder focus over the decade of the 1990s, it could be that there is not sufficient cross-sectional variation among them, thus potentially compromising our statistical tests for differential share price effects. Index') intended to capture these three dimensions, based on factors such as the clarity of the annual report, the existence of an investor relations department, non-fixed top-management compensation, and the implementation of shareholder-oriented profitability metrics. The firms and the corresponding Hoepner index scores are shown in Table 5 .
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(TABLE 5 HERE)
Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine the empirical effects of the changes in German corporate law and the purpose of the large-scale, publicly traded German corporations over the past two decades. Specifically, based on the hypotheses developed in Section 5, we test for differences between the MSO and LSO samples on the following variables: (1) the mean return over various governance regimes; (2) The rank (Pearson) correlation coefficient between our two sets of governace scores for these firms is 0.83 (the correlation is significant at the 1% level). 37 The major finding of the Hoepner study is a positive and significant relation between his index and the number of shares held by institutional investors. He did not investigate the returns to the equities of these firms.
index of U.S. stocks; and (3) the variance of the returns to the relevant portfolios over the three regimes.
We divide the time periods as follows: In event studies such as these, there is always a tradeoff between the length of the time period studied and the number of firms in the sample: the longer the time period, the more precise the estimates of the relevant parameters; however the longer the time period required, the fewer the number of firms in the sample. As a result, we decided to begin our analysis in 1980.
This choice reduces the number of firms in our sample to 22, which we felt was the minimum acceptable. The eleven firms that we classified as having "more shareholder orientation" (MSO) have scores that range from 11 to 8, with a mean of 9 and a standard deviation of 1. The eleven firms that have "less shareholder orientation" (LSO) have scores that range firms 7 to 0, with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 2. In order to test for the relation between the means and Betas of the two groups over the three time periods, we run a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
analysis. This technique corrects for the serial correlation in the contemporaneous returns to the two groups. We have two equations in the model, one for each group. In each regression we include a dummy variable corresponding to the three time periods under study. We also include three interaction variables consisting of the product of the dummy variables times the return on the S&P index. Specifically, the system of equations we estimate is: where MSO t is the weekly return to the portfolio of shares of the eleven DAX 30 firms we deem more shareholder value-oriented, and LSO t is the weekly return to the portfolio of shares of the DAX 30 firms that we deem less shareholder value-oriented. The D i are dummy variables that equal 1 over the indicated period and zero otherwise, and S&P t is the weekly return to the Standard & Poors' 500 index. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6 . (TABLE 6 HERE)
The data in Table 6 show that the mean return to the two portfolios are positive in the first period, however they are not different from each other. None of the constant terms (Alphas) in periods 2 or 3 is significantly different from zero. Thus, there is no evidence that the mean return to the MSO firms is any different than the mean return to the LSO firms in any of the three periods.
The estimates for the Betas, however, reveal interesting patterns. First, note that the Betas of both the MSO and the LSO firms relative to the S&P 500 returns are significantly greater than zero for all three periods. 
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The last row of Table 6 indicates, moreover, that there is a significant upward Beta shift in the shareholder value period (Period 3) relative to both the previous periods, while there is no significant upward shift between the codetermination period (Period 1) and the transition period (Period 2). The most intriguing result, however, is the significant difference between the Betas in shareholder value period for the two sub-samples.
The data indicate that the Beta for MSO firms (0.65) is greater than the Beta of the LSO firms (0.55), with the t-statistic of the difference being 3.67. Thus, the shift to shareholder value-39 This is, perhaps, to be expected. As Harvey (1991) showed, developed-country equity market indices, including that of Germany, are integrated across countries and behave as though they are 'globally' priced. In other words, regardless of the underlying cause of the integration, we should expect similar effects across both the MSO and the LSO sub-samples. Fundamentals such as increased German exports to the US and increased German direct foreign investment (DFI) in the US could help explain the integration. Between 1990 and 2000, exports to the US as a percentage of German GDP went up from 1.73% to 3.10%; DFI into the US as a percentage of German GDP went up from 0.14% to 0.89% (based on analysis of data from various issues of the US Statistical Abstract and the
International Monetary Fund's International Finanial Statistics).
40 Such a Beta shift is consistent with the time-varying covariances documented in Harvey (1991) .
orientation in Germany appears to be associated with a greater covariance between the returns to the MSO firms and the firms in the S&P 500. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, compared to the LSO firms, the MSO firms are being priced similarly to the shareholder-oriented US firms in the S&P 500.
An obvious critique of the analysis presented in Table 6 , and one suggested by the findings in Harvey (1991) , is that, since firms in both groups are moving toward shareholder value-orientation, there may not be sufficient variation in the two samples to detect a significant effect on mean returns and Betas. We are able to (at least, partially) circumvent this issue by performing the same tests as above on the independently-developed Hoepner sample, which we discussed in the previous Section. The Hoepner Index is constructed to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. (See Table 5 .) We classify those firms with a score greater than zero as being 'More Shareholder Oriented' (MSO) and those with a score of zero or less as being 'Less Shareholder Oriented' (LSO). We are able to find returns data for 16 firms in the Hoepner MSO sample, and 13 in the Hoepner LSO sample. The mean Hoepner Index in the MSO sample is .72, with a standard deviation of .43. The mean score in the Hoepner LSO sample is -0.97, with a standard deviation of .71.
As with the DAX 30 sample, we performed a SUR analysis on the returns to the shares of the firms in the Hoepner sample. The results are reported in Table 7 . The data show that the mean return for the Hoepner MSO sample is significantly greater that the mean return for the Hoepner LSO sample in the third period. Thus, unlike the DAX sample, the Hoepner sample reveals a significantly higher return to the MSO sample over the third period. Similar to the DAX 30 results, we find statistically significant Betas for both samples in all three periods, with the Betas for the "shareholder value" period being significantly greater than those for the "codetermination" period.
(TABLE 7 HERE)
As in the case of the DAX sample, the Beta is significantly greater for the Hoepner MSO sample than the Hoepner LSO sample in the "shareholder value" period. Again, we are tempted to conclude that this increase in the relative covariances with the S&P index is evidence of the returns to more shareholder value-oriented German firms being generated by market factors similar to those for their shareholder-oriented counterparts in the S&P index.
It may be argued that the increase in the Betas of the German firms in the "shareholder value" period relative to the S&P is due to the fact that a number of German firms had ADRs during this time period and not due to any increased focus on shareholder value per se.
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In order to test for an 'ADR effect,' we re-estimate the parameters of the model excluding the four firms in the Hoepner sample that had ADRs listed on the NYSE. The results of this test are reported in Table 8 .
(TABLE 8 HERE)
The results of the SUR for the Hoepner sample, excluding the four firms with ADRs, are similar to those from the previous tests. The only major difference in the results is that the mean return to the shares in the Hoepner MSO sample is not statistically different from the mean return to the shares in the LSO sample in the shareholder value period. The t-statistic of the difference falls from 2.15 in the total sample to 1.72 in the sample excluding firms with ADRs. Thus, although the mean return is greater for the MSO sub-sample, the difference is not as great as it is in the total Hoepner sample. This is evidence of a small ADR effect.
Since we find a significant increase in the Betas of the firms in the MSO sub-samples in both the DAX and Hoepner samples, we turn to an examination of the change in variances of the returns to the S&P 500, the DAX 30 and its components and the Hoepner sample. The weekly standard deviation of the returns to the returns to the various portfolios over the three sub-periods are reported in Table 9 .
(TABLE 9 HERE)
Interestingly, the standard deviation of the weekly returns of the S&P 500 is 2.86% in the "codetermination" period (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and 2.88% in the "shareholder value" period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . 41 Researchers have found that firms with ADR listings are valued differently compared to non-listing firms in their home countries-for instance, Sundaram and Logue (1996) find a 10% increase in country-benchmarked Market-toBook ratios for firms with an ADR listing; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find a 16.5% increase in the countrybenchmarked Tobin's q ratio for firms with ADR listings. To the extent that such higher valuations imply higher growth opportunities, we might expect the Betas of ADR listing firms to shift over time.
This implies that the increase in the Betas documented for the German firms in the sample is due to an increase in the covariances with the returns to the S&P.
We next examine the time-series of the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of assets (Market-to-Book ratios) for each of our sub-samples over the decade of the 1990s. We also examine the annual growth rate in market capitalization over the same period. The data are taken from the Worldscope database. Table 10 shows that the average Market-to-Book ratio for the entire period is positive and significant for both MSO and LSO firms in the DAX Sample. However, the ratios are not significantly different from each other. The slope coefficients tell a different story. While the slopes are positive and significantly different from zero for both, the slope coefficient for the MSO firms is significantly greater than that for the LSO firms. The results indicate that the growth in Market-to-Book was greater for the more shareholder-oriented group. The results for the Hoepner sample, also reported in Table 10 , tell a similar story. Here again, although the average Market-to-Book ratio is greater for the MSO firms, the t-statistic of the difference from the Market-to-Book ratio of LSO firms is not significant. Consistent with the results for the DAX sample, the slope coefficient for the MSO firms is significantly higher than that for the LSO sample. These results reinforce the interpretation that the Market-to-Book ratio increased significantly more for the more shareholder value-oriented German firms during the decade of the 1990s. The faster growth in the Market-to-Book ratios is consistent with the higher Betas for the MSO firms.
(TABLE 10 HERE) Table 11 shows that the annual growth rate in equity market capitalization over the relevant time period was significantly higher form the MSO firms than the LSO firms in the DAX sample. This difference is also positive for the Hoepner sample; however, it is not statistically different from zero.
(TABLE 11 HERE)
Finally, we examine the restructuring activity of DAX firms as measured by their divestitures and asset sales during the 1990s, compared to all German firms and to EU firms (Table 12 ). The data are from the SDC database on mergers and acquisitions.
( that the period of shareholder value-orientation in the large German corporation coincided with much higher levels of restructuring activity, presumably reflecting deconglomeration.
Conclusion
We began this paper by asking three questions: (1) Are the transformations in the German governance system that we observed over the decade of the 1990s consistent with the traditional stakeholder-oriented German corporation, or are we witnessing the third largest industrial economy in the world moving toward an American-style, shareholder-oriented corporate economy? (2) What are the efficiency and share price implications for German firms adopting such practices? (3) What are the implications of these changes for the traditional governance practice embodied in the stakeholder doctrine of 'codetermination,' which, prior to the decade of the 1990s, had been the centerpiece of German corporate law?
The answer to Question 1 is unambiguous. Without a doubt, the large, publicly traded, German corporation underwent a significant transformation in its corporate purpose during the decade of the 1990s. German firms moved quite substantially from a stakeholder orientation to a shareholder orientation, and this move was facilitated by far-reaching changes in German corporate law during this period. We document the changes in these regulations and present evidence that many firms took the opportunity afforded by the new regulatory environment to adopt a more shareholder-oriented philosophy. Changes in operating and restructuring policies such as the adoption of management incentive compensation plans, better disclosure policies, ADR listings and the increase in divestitures and asset sales, all signal greater commitment to align management and shareholder interests. We also observed a significant shift in the rhetoric of shareholder value among both the German public and among German managers.
But rhetoric is not all that changed. In answer to Question 2, our analysis shows that firms that adopted more shareholder-oriented governance structures and operating strategies performed better, along certain dimensions, than did firms that were less shareholder-oriented.
Our most robust finding is that the Beta of the returns to the more shareholder-oriented firms, relative to the US S&P 500, increased significantly more than the Beta of the returns to less shareholder-oriented firms. This suggests that the managers of more shareholder-oriented firms took on higher-risk projects that were more sensitive to global market fluctuations. We believe that this higher covariance with the returns to large US firms is an indication that such German firms are affected by similar market forces and perhaps, by similar pricing effects in the global financial marketplace. We also saw that firms that embraced shareholder value-orientation realized significant increases in Market-to-Book ratios and equity market capitalization relative to their less shareholder-oriented counterparts Our answer to Question 3 is speculative. We feel that even though this transformation toward shareholder-orientation has been far-reaching, the changed corporate purpose does not, by any means, signal an end to the German practice of codetermination. Recall the basic rationale for why shareholder value maximization should be the corporate objective: By assigning control rights to the residual claimant, the incentive is put in place to maximize the value of the whole firm. In other words, to the extent that shareholder value maximization is the only goal that is consistent with enlarging the size of the corporate pie for all claimants, it is manifestly pro-stakeholder. Any potential conflicts between labor and equity can be overcome by providing a share of the residual claim to labor. This is exactly what many Germans firms have done, through their provision of stock-and option-based incentive schemes for managers and employees. There is nothing that would then argue against labor as shareholders having a voice on the corporate board. If anything, it probably legitimizes and even strengthens the shareholder-oriented corporate purpose while simultaneously preserving codetermination, a practice that reflects a uniquely German innovation in corporate governance and one that is enshrined and cherished in German law. We therefore disagree with those who might argue that this shift in the corporate purpose could somehow weaken codetermination: we would suggest the reverse.
We admit the possibility that the governance index-based classification scheme we developed is prone to potential biases and misspecifications. However, the fact that the results are nearly identical in empirical tests across two independently constructed governance classifications-both our Index and the independently developed Hoepner Index-lends credence to our results. Moreover, our findings are consistent with what we might expect to observe when the operating strategies of public corporations change from a stakeholder-to a shareholder-orientation. 
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The major finding of the Hoepner study is a positive and significant relation between his index and the number of shares held by institutional investors.
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The dependent variables in the system are the weekly returns to the indicated subset of DAX firms from 1980 to 2002.
The independent variables in the system are a matrix of dummy variables with elements equal to one over the indicated time period and zero otherwise, and a matrix of interaction terms with elements equal to the product of the return to the the S&P and the dummy variable for the indicated period. Table 7 Results of a Seemingly Unrelated Regression of the Weekly Return to the Shares of the Largest Forty Non-Financial German Firms on the Weekly Returns to the S&P 500
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